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Clerk, Supreme (E£n 
i 
Hi THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATS OF UTAH 
JOliNG. WELLS, * 
Plaintiff and Appellant. * 
vs. * PETITION FOR REHEARING 
CITY COURT OF LOGAii CITY, * Mo. 13824 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF 
UTAH, * 
I IP 
Pawffi L L K ^ 3 
Defendant and Respondent. MAY 1 O 1Q7£ KJ J / U 
~ """"""'dark' SvpmmB €huzit Ufak 
Comes now Burton H. Harris, County Attorney of Cache County* 
Utah, and petitions the above entitled Court for a rehearing in 
the case of John G. Wells, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. City Court 
of Logan City, County of Cache, State of Utah, Defendant and A 
Respondent, filed May 1/1975, No. 13824. 
The Petition for Rehearing is based upon the following groil&ds; I 
1. The Supreme Court failed to consider the provisions of 
41-6-167 U.C.A., relating to procedures and 4i^#~169, relating to 
jurisdiction and other inexclusive requirements in its decision. i 
2. The Court failed to consider whether or not compliance 1 
with Section 416166 U.C.A. confers upon that magistrate exclusive 
jurisdiction for the trial of the matter. 
3. The Court failed to define whether or not failure to coiaply 
with 416166 is jurisdictional and prevents further prosecution of 
the Defendant in contravention to Section 41~€~1£9. ** 
4. That the Utah Association of City Judge* did not have knowledge 5 
of the pendency of this appeal and now desire to file a Brief in 
•vs-.aj'K-:. 
fch4« fnj»4*4-*fc*» «.— 4—. A~%^~ 
"U^USITURB, xuim L»eienaanc ana nesponaent petitions the above 
entitled Court for a hearing in this matter and for the extension 
of time as set forth in the attached motion. 
Dated this day of Hay, 1975. 
'&• 
,#| w4 
.f %*£X {.s; 
-2-
B. H. HARRIS, COUNTY ATTORNEY 
George wr* Preston 
/ Deputy Cache County Attorney 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Petition 
for Rehearing to Charles V. Olson, Attorney at Law,56 tfest Center, 
Logan, Utah 84321, t h i s d a y of May, 1975, 
\H 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN WELLS, * 
* 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * 
* 
vs. * Case No. 13824 
* 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY, * 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH, * 
* ' 
Defendant and Respondent. * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as initially set forth in the briefs 
of the parties are suffficient for the purpose of this rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IN ITS DECISION DATED THE 1ST DAY OF RAY, 1975, 
DID NOT CONSIDER THE PROVISIONS OF 41-6-167 U.C.A., RELATING TO 
PROCEDURES AND 41-6-169 U.C.A., RELATING"-TO JURISDICTION AND OTHER 
NONEXCLUSIVE REQUIREMENTS. 
Sections 41-6-167 of the U.C.A. is a statute that outlines 
the procedures to be used by an officer in the event of an arrest 
made without a warrant under any one of four conditions. The statute 
was enacted in 1941 by the legislature and it uses the word of 
-2-
command "shall immediately be taken". Reading this statute alone ' 
there is no discretion with the officer as to what must be done ; 
in each of the four instances enumerated. The purpose of such 
statute is to insure that the arrested person is advised of a charge 
made against him so that he may prepare his defense, to protect him 
from being held without communications and to prevent secret and 
extended interrogation by the arresting officers. Prompt access 
to the magistrate as the practical result of affording the arrested 
person an early opportunity to secure his release pending ultimate 
disposition of the charge. 
The Courts of this nation have recognized that some latitude 
must be allowed the officers in connection with the "shall immedi-
ately command" of the statute. Consideration must be had for other 
urgent commitments as well as necessary activities in connection 
with the Ccise, such as booking the prisoner, routinely questioning 
and searching him', routine breathalizer or blood tests. See Williams 
vs. United States, 273 Fed. 2d 781, 1959 California, holding that 
there was no unnecessary delay in arraigning a prisoner who was held 
at the place of arrest until the completion of search of the premises• 
See also Mailory vs. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 1479; People vs. Hamilton, Michigan, 102 NW 2d 738. 
See also 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest, Section 77, 6 C.J.S. Arrest, Section 
17(b), 79 ALR 13; People vs. Serrano, California, 11 P. 2d 81, 
19 ALR 2d, 1331 and Supplementary Service. 
A person suffering from the excess consumption of alcohol is 
not in a position at the time of his arrest to make an intelligent 
-3-
decision as to legal matter confronting him. Therefore, a rea-
sonable time should be given to dispel any disability so that a 
orderly proceedings could be had. 
See Anderson vs. Foster, Idaho, 252 P. 2d 199, Arneson vs. 
Thorstad, Iowa, 33 NW 607, McClanahan vs. State, Indiana, 112 NE 
2d, 575; and United States vs. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508, Massachusetts, 
1963. 
The officer's inability to gain access to a magistrate, as where 
the Courts are closed, may also delay the time of appearance of the 
individual although not extend said time beyond a reasonable time. 
See 6 C. J. Arrest 17(b) People vs. Jackson, Illnois, 178 NE 2d 299, 
McClanahan vs. State Supra, Rounds vs. Bucher, Montana 349, P. 2d 
1026; and United States vs. Ladson, 294 F. 2d 535; State vs. Riner, 
Oregon, 485 P. 2d 1234; and State vs. Ramos, Arizona, 463 P. 2d 91; 
Arabia vs. State, Nevada 421 ?. 2d 952. 
Laws of Arrest by Edward C. Fisher, Pages 347 to 353 and Supple-
ment. 
The legislature also enacted 41-1-167, which was changed in 
1949 to read that upon taking the person to the magistrate, the 
person shall be advised of the crime charged against him and a 
notice to appear in "court". The statute then continues to give 
guidelines to the office and the magistrate as to the proper pro-
cedure. At the time of the passage of these statutes the legisla-
ture also passed 41-6-169, which states that the provisions of the* 
two statutes above referred to shall govern all police officers in 
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making an arrest without a warrant but that the procedure prescribed 
shall not be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for7-
the arrest and prosecution of a person an offense of like grade. 
All three of these statutes must be construed together and 
given a reasonable meaning. This Court's holding and its decision 
construes the provisions of 41-6-166 U.C.A. but gives no guidelines 
as to how that section dovetails with Section 41-6-167 procedurally. 
Section 41-6-169 was not discussed in this Court's decision and it 
is felt that this Court should interpret this section' in the light 
of its decision. - r 
It is the Respondent's position that where"a statute provides 
separate and distinct procedures for the handling of criminal com-
plaints, that the State's Prosecutor has an election as to the 
remedy and that a defendant cannot complain because one remedy was 
used and not the other. Section 41-6-44.10 provides .that a motorist 
give his implied consent to the taking of a chemical test. The 
defendant had to be transported to Logan for that test and the 
accuracy of the test is determined in part by the time lapse be-
tween the commission of the offense and the taking of the test. 
Therefore, the taking of the test was a lawful act within the 
reasonable time period allowed by law and at that time the Defendant 
could either: 
1. Be taken before a magistrate as provided in 41-6-166. 
2* Be arrested and taken before a magistrate as provided 
in Section 77-13-17 where a complaint must be made. 
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3. Be charged with an offense by a complctint and summons 
as provided in Section 77-12-21. * ' : ^ 
These three methods are each available to the office and 
are elective by the officer, as provided in Section 41-6-169* 
POINT II ' 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT 
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 41-6-166, CONFERS UPON THAT MAGISTRATE 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE MATTER. :~ ' ./':•. ,\ 
Section 41-6-166 U.C.A. states that the person shall be imme-
diately taken before a magistrate within the County. 
Section 41-6-167 states that the reason for taking the person 
and the procedure to be followed. Neither section states that the 
magistrate referred to in the section has sole or exclusive juris-
diction to try the case upon the merits. .!?. 
It is the Statefs contention that even though the Justice 
Court of Wellsville was nearest to the place of the offense that
 : 
the Wellsville Court did not by virtue by of that fact alone have 
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear the matter on the merits. 
The City Court of Logan City is a Court with similar jurisdiction 
to hear cases of this nature and is situated within Cache County. 
Section 41-6-167 states that the written notice prepared by the 
officer shall contain ''the time and place, when and where such per-
son shall appear in Court.11 If it were assumed by the legislature 
that the person were to appear in the same Court, such additional 
-6-
notice would not be necessary. Subsection C of that same statute 
would be totally unnecessary if the person were to appear in the: 
same Court at the same place. The legislature has appeared to 
indicate by the language of the statutes that the Trial Court may 
not necessarily be the same Court or magistrate as referred to in 
41-6-166 U.C.A. . •;'-•••'«' - : * V 
This same impression is gained from reading of 77-57-2 U.C.A. 
where it states that the "complaint shall be commenced before a 
magistrate within the precinct of the county or city in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed." . . . . . . . 
POINT III .-,-'.. 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT FAILED TO DEFINE WHETHER OR NOT 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 41-6-166 IS JURISDICTIONAL AND 
PREVENTS FURTHER PROSECUTION OF THE DFENDANT. - - -
This Court in its decision stated that it was the State1s duty, 
once the question of 41-6-166 U.C.A. procedure was raised by the 
defendant, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it followed the 
statutory interdictions. This would seem to add an element to the 
offense of Driving Under the Influence. The Respondent seeks this 
Court's clarification as to whether or not such evidence is an 
element of the crime or whether or not it is a jurisdictional ~ 
requirement subject to dismissal of the action upon failure of the 
State to show compliance with the section. --" '', 
It is the Respondent's position that the requirement of 
Section 41-6-166 is not jurisdictional to the maintenance of this 
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action, by reason of Section 41-6-169 which provides for other 
means for filing a complaint and the fact that the legislature in 
enacting 41-6-166 and 41-6-167 did not state in the text of the 
sections that failure to comply with the sections barred the main-
 : 
tenance of the action by the State of Utah. Section 41-6-167 pro-
vides that the office shall be guilty of misconduct in office and 
subject to removal for violating the provision of the section, but 
this provision must be looked at in the light of Section 41-6-169 
which provides for alternative remedies. If the officer does, :in 
fact, comply with an alternative remedy which is allowed by the 
rules of criminal procedure will this exonerate the officer from 
any misconduct that he might otherwise by guilty of? Respondent 
claims that such an alternative filing will, in fact, exonerate-the 
officer. ,-, "j •'.'.'• .;'• ,.-.v;. - i:•-•••••; ;•-." 
The crux of Section 41-6-167 is that the person be advised 
of the charge against him, that he be given a time and place of 
appearance and that he must be given a chance to secure his release. 
The last aspect of the statute seems pertinent in this case as the 
plaintiff was not incarcerated and he was released on bail at the 
Cache County Sheriff's Office. 
See Dragna vs. White, California, 289 P. 2d 428, where the 
Court held.that an unreasonable delay in taking an arrested person ~ 
before a magistrate does not vitiate an otherwise valid arrest and 
State vs. Roy, Minnesota, 122 NW 2d 615, where the Court held that 
an unreasonable delay does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court 
~8~ 
to try the Defendant on the charge or result in the denial of a 
fair trial. -'•. ~ - - -3 • 
See State vs. Maldonado, Arizona 373 P. 2d 583, People vs. 
Lane, California, 366 P. 2d 57; Gottfried vs. People, Colorado, 
408 P. 2d 431; McFarland vs. State, Kansas, 411 P. 2d 658; and 
Cooper vs. State, Kansas, 411 P. 2d 652. Courts of various states 
have held that the failure to comply with a statute such as the one 
in question here is not ground for an acquittal of the defendant 
nor does it necessarily invalidate subsequent conviction where the 
defendant suffers no prejudice as a result of illegal detention or 
where he is deprived of the opportunity of being able to procure 
evidence in his defense. See State vs. Tillett, 233 SW 2d 690, 
Missouri; Henderson vs. Maxwell, Ohio, 198 NE 2d 456; Stroble vs* 
California 343 U.S. 181, 72 S. Ct. 599. /^  
The United States Supreme Court has generally not allowed 
evidence taken by police officers during an unreasonable length 
of interrogation or incarceration. However, this question relates 
to admissibility of the evidence and not the ability of the defendant 
to terminate all proceedings against him by reason of this claim. 
POINT IV - ••- -••.-."'' 
THAT THE ASSOCIATION OF CITY JUDGES DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE PENDENCY OF THIS APPEAL AND NOW DESIRE TO FILE A BRIEF IN 
THIS MATTER AS AN AMICUS CURIAE INASMUCH AS THIS DECISION AFFECTS 
THESE MAGISTRATES ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.' s -^: • * 
-9-
The decision in this case affects all lav/ enforcement agencies 
and prosecutors. However, the real impact of the decision is upon 
the judicial system* It is assumed that if the Utah Association 
of City Judges has at this time sought permission from this Court 
to file a brief in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the Respondent's position in this case that this Court 
erred in the holding announced. A decision of this Court one way 
or the other will require that this Court give guidance to those 
persons directly affected, whether they be citizens, justices of 
the peace, or law enforcement officers. Without the guidelines 
three groups of people are in limbo; the citizen as he does not 
know his rights, the police officer as he does not knov/ his alterna-
tives, and the Judges as they do not know how to equate between the 
rights of the citizens and the alternatives of the police officer. 
It is, therefore, the request of the Respondent that this 
Court grant a rehearing that the parties may be heard in this raatter. 
Dated this day of June, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. H. HARRIS 
Cache County Attorney 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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